Concerned or Just Plain Nosy? The Consequences of Parental Wiretapping Under the Federal Wiretap Act in Light of Pollock v. Pollock by Killian, Laura S.
Volume 104 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 104, 
1999-2000 
3-1-2000 
Concerned or Just Plain Nosy? The Consequences of Parental 
Wiretapping Under the Federal Wiretap Act in Light of Pollock v. 
Pollock 
Laura S. Killian 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Laura S. Killian, Concerned or Just Plain Nosy? The Consequences of Parental Wiretapping Under the 
Federal Wiretap Act in Light of Pollock v. Pollock, 104 DICK. L. REV. 561 (2000). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol104/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Note I
Concerned or Just Plain Nosy? The
Consequences of Parental Wiretapping
Under the Federal Wiretap Act in Light
of Pollock v. Pollock
Title III Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Title III), commonly referred to as the Federal Wiretapping Act,
subjects "any person who -(a) intentionally intercepts.., any wire,
oral, or electronic communication" to criminal liability unless a
specified exemption applies.1  Two such commonly applied
exemptions are the consent and extension exemptions.2 The
consent exemption excludes all recordings from Title III when one
of the parties to the conversation has given prior consent.' The
extension exemption, also known as the "ordinary course of
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994). Title III provides the following:
(4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device;
(12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce...
Id. at § 2510 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. See id. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2510(5)(a).
3. See id. § 2511(2)(d).
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business exemption,"4 exempts "any telephone or telegraph
instrument, equipment or facility or any component thereof, (i)
furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service.., and being used by the
subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business. . . ."'
These exemptions are open to interpretation when applied to
parents who record their minor children's phone conversations.
Generally, this issue arises during bitter custody disputes when a
custodial parent uses an extension phone inside the home to record
phone calls between the noncustodial parent and the child.6
The doctrine of vicarious consent was adopted under the
consent exemption by the Sixth Circuit as a matter of first
impression in Pollock v. Pollock! The court held that parents may
consent for their children when the recording of the calls is in the
child's best interest.8 In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit
refused to follow other circuit courts that have applied the
extension exemption to parental wiretapping.9  Although one
cannot discuss the subject of parental wiretapping without a
discussion of this exemption, this Note will not focus on whether it
applies to domestic situations. Rather, this Note will focus on the
Pollock decision and the circumstances and issues surrounding the
application of a vicarious consent analysis. Part I will discuss the
facts and holding of Pollock, Part II will summarize the extension
exemption debate and the history of parental wiretapping, and Part
III will examine the consent exemption as it applies to parental
wiretapping.
I. Pollock v. Pollock
A. Facts
Samuel and Sandra Pollock were married in 1977 and had
three children together, Courtney, born 1981, Robert, born 1984,
and Ian, born 1987.1' In 1993 they divorced and Samuel remarried
4. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1998).
5. See U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i).
6. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 603("[T]he tape recordings.. .that form the basis
of this lawsuit occurred in the context of a bitter and protracted child custody
dispute."); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1191 (E.D Ark. 1998).
7. 154 F.3d at 610.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 607.
10. See id. at 603.
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his current wife, Laura." Sandra was granted custody of all three
children." Samuel appealed the final decree and a custody dispute
ensued over Courtney, who was fourteen at the time.3 During the
dispute Sandra tape-recorded Courtney's phone conversations with
Samuel and Laura on an extension phone in Sandra's bedroom
over a period of a few weeks in 19954
During one phone call between Courtney and Laura, Courtney
complained about a court order requiring her to live with her
mother, after which she and Laura joked about killing Sandra's two
attorneys and the judge that granted custody to Sandra. 15 Hearing
this conversation, Sandra became alarmed and frightened, and
claimed that it "gave [her] immediate concern for the safety and
well-being of three other individuals and confirmed to [her] the
abuse and emotional injury and harm she suspected Courtney was
being subjected to., 16 According to Laura, however, it was clearly
obvious from the tape that the two had made the remarks "in
obvious jest and with no semblance of seriousness."' 7  Sandra
claimed she recorded the conversations in an attempt to prove that
Samuel was psychologically and emotionally abusing Courtney."
She felt that "Samuel was trying to get Courtney to do whatever she
could to convince [Sandra] to let Courtney primarily live with
Samuel."19 Sandra further believed that Courtney had an excessive
and compulsive desire to live with her father which had caused the
mother-daughter relationship to deteriorate ° and that her only
motivation for recording Courtney's conversations was "concern
for her child's well being."'"
11. See id. Sandra and Samuel had separated in 1992 after she discovered he
was having an affair. See id.
12. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 603.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 604.
15. See id.
16. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 103). Sandra discussed this conversation
with her attorney who reported the situation to the Crimes Against Children Unit
(CACU). See id. The CACU then revealed the contents of the tape to the
presiding judge in Samuel and Sandra's divorce and custody cases who entered it
as part of the official record. See id. at 605.
17. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 605.
18. Id. at 604.
19. Id.
20. See id. Courtney blames the deteriorating relationship on the fact that she
does not get along well with her mother, was not happy living with her, and does
get along with her father and step-mother. See id. at 605. She further stated that
the relationship was strained by her mother's relationship with a convicted felon
who was only a few years older than Courtney. See id.
21. See id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 102-103). Sandra's stated she believed
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On the other hand, Samuel and Laura alleged that Sandra's
motivation arose out of anger towards Courtney." They claimed
Sandra became angry when she learned that a phone call between
herself and Courtney had been recorded and recorded the calls "to
return the favor."' 3 Laura further believed Sandra's anger was a
result of discovering, upon reading Courtney's diary, that Samuel
had hired an attorney to represent Courtney in the on-going
custody dispute.24 She was alleged to have recorded the calls to
eavesdrop on the privileged conversations between Courtney and
her attorney.'
B. The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Samuel and Laura brought action against Sandra under 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) for intentionally recording their phone conver-
sations with Courtney without either party's consent 6 The court
qualified vicarious consent under the consent exemption and
granted summary judgment to Sandra,27 finding that no question of
material fact existed as to whether she acted in Courtney's best
interest." In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Scheib v. Grant29 and the Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals' decision in Silas v. Silas' which granted summary
judgement to the recording parent.31 The court stated that Samuel
and Laura failed to show more than the existence of "tension and
bitterness" between the parties to prove that Sandra's motives were
improper.2
throughout the divorce and custody proceedings that Courtney was being
emotionally abused. See id.
22. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 605.
23. Id. It was disputed as to who Courtney said actually recorded this
conversation; Sandra believed that Courtney accused Samuel and Laura, while
Courtney and Laura claim that Courtney recorded the conversation. See id.
24. See id. Courtney also believed her mother began recording her calls after
reading her diary. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 605.
28. See id.
29. 22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1994).
30. 680 So.2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
31. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 612.
32. See id.
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C. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's adoption of
vicarious consent but found that a question of material fact existed
as to Sandra's motives, reversed summary judgment and remanded
the case for trial.33 The Sixth Circuit criticized the district court for
failing to consider Samuel, Laura, and Courtney's testimonies
regarding Sandra's motives?" The Pollock court upheld its prior
decision in United States v. Murdock" rejecting the applicability of
the extension exemption to domestic situations. 36 The court chose
instead to apply the best interests standard established by the
District Court of Utah in Thompson v. Dulaney.37 This standard
emphasizes that the recording parent must demonstrate "a good
faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing that it is necessary
and in the best interest of the child."
38
II. The Extension Exemption and the History of Parental
Wiretapping
The issue of parental wiretapping initially came to light in
Anonymous v. Anonymous under the extension exemption.39 A
custodial father had recorded his children's conversations with their
mother by turning the record knob on the answering machine every
time that she called.'4 The court held that the recording father was
exempt under the extension exemption because the use of an
extension phone in one's own home is "certainly... in the 'ordinary
course of(the user's) business.' 41 The court further stated that the
wiretapping occurred in a purely domestic context and did not rise
to the level of criminal conduct.
33. See id. As of the date of publication for this article, the case is pending in
the Western District of Kentucky.
34. See id. at 611-612.
35. 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995).
36. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 607.
37. See id. at 610; Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah
1993).
38. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
39. See 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
40. See id. at 678.
41. Id. at 678-79 (citation omitted).
42. See id. at 679. While the court noted that Congress was aware of the
occurrence of domestic wiretapping, Congress's primary concern was organized
crime, and the facts in Anonymous did not rise to that level. See id. at 677.
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The extension exemption is included as an exception to the
definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other device. 4 3  The
exemption is as follows:
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means... other
than -
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility...
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business...
Courts have looked to the plain language, and most debatably,
the legislative intent of Title III to determine its scope.4
The Tenth Circuit in Newcomb v. Ingle4 6 found Title III to
indicate clearly Congress's intent "to abjure from deciding a very
intimate question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy
family members may expect within the home vis-a-vis each other.,
47
In that case a mother recorded the conversations of her son with
her ex-husband.4' One of the conversations revealed the father
instructing the son and his brother as they set fire to their house.49
The court reasoned that a broad reading of Title III indicates that
Congress would not create an exemption for only businesses, and
not one for homes.
50
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Scheib v. Grant stated that
Congress could not have meant for parents to be criminally liable
for taping their children's conversations when the parents act out of
concern for their children's welfare.51 In Scheib, a father used an
answering machine to record two phone calls between his son, who
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (i)(1994).
44. See id.
45. See Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944
F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir.); Kempf v.
Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.
1984); U.S. v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
46. See Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1534.
47. Id. (quoting Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974)).
48. See id. at 1535.
49. See id. Criminal charges were brought against the father and the son after
the mother sent the tapes to an assistant county attorney. See id. The charges
against the son were dismissed and he subsequently brought suit under 18 U.S.C. §
2511 against his mother. See id.
50. See id. at 1536.
51. See 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We cannot attribute to Congress the
intent to subject parents to criminal and civil penalties for recording their minor
child's phone conversations out of concern for that child's well-being").
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was visiting for the summer, and the mother. 2 The court examined
Title III's language to conclude that the words "subscriber" and
"user" are not "exclusively market-oriented connotations," and
thus apply to the home. 3 The phrase "in the ordinary course of
business," when read with the words "subscriber" and "user," then
indicates that the exemption is not exclusive to commercial
situations but applies to domestic situations as well 4
The Pollock court refused to apply the extension exemption to
parental wiretapping based on its decision in Murdock.5  In
Murdock, Mrs. Murdock, the defendant's wife, became suspicious
of her husband's personal and business conduct.56 She recorded all
calls at the funeral home business the couple owned together from
two business extensions inside their home. 7 The Sixth Circuit did
not exempt Mrs. Murdock under the extension exemption because
her conduct, "spying on one's spouse," was not in the ordinary
course of the funeral home's business. The court further held that
the recording device placed on the extension phone intercepted the
calls, not the extension phone. 9 The recording device was not
provided by "a provider of wire or electronic communication
service", 6° and therefore, was not covered by the extension
exemption.6'
Other circuits faced with facts similar to those of Murdock
have criticized the application of the extension exemption in
domestic contexts and look to the purpose of Title III - to
"effectively prohibit.. .all interceptions of oral and wire
52. See id. at 151.
53. See id. at 154.
54. See id.
55. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1998).
56. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1392 (6th Cir. 1995).
57. See id. Mrs. Murdock attached on/off switches to the tape recorders to
allow her to control the recording equipment. See id. She recorded the calls for
three months until her son from a previous marriage told her that it was illegal.
See id.
58. See id. at 1400. Although Murdock analyzed both Mrs. Murdock's
business and personal concerns under this standard, Pollock focused on the
personal aspect of the analysis. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 607. Murdock stated that
recording phone calls in an employment context is in the ordinary course of
business when done "to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use"
and for only "as long as the call involves the type of information the supervisor
fears is being disclosed." Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1396. Mrs. Murdock
indiscriminately recorded all calls at the funeral home and thus was not acting in
the ordinary course of business. See id. at 1397.
59. See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1395.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)(1994). Mrs. Murdock had purchased the tape
recorders from Radio Shack. See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1392.
61. See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1395.
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communications, except those specifically provided for in the
Act..." - to stress that the unambiguous language does not include
an express or implied exemption for domestic situations.62 The
comments of Senator Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and Senator Hruska, a co-sponsor of the bill, were
relied on to show the congressional awareness of wiretapping
within the home.63 Senator Long noted "the three major areas in
which private electronic surveillance was widespread were (1)
industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics." '  Senator Hruska
stated that "[a] broad prohibition is imposed on private use of
electronic surveillance, particularly in domestic relations and
industrial espionage situations., 65 Similarly, much weight was given
to the testimony of Professor Robert Blakey, who is recognized as
the author of Title III.6 He stated that "private bugging in this
country can be divided into two broad categories, commercial
espionage and marital litigation."67
With the exception of the Tenth Circuit, the above reasoning
was used to prohibit all wiretapping under the extension
exemption.68 Only the Tenth Circuit in Newcomb broadened its
interpretation of Title III to exclude parents from its prohibition,
finding interspousal wiretapping to be "qualitatively different from
a custodial parent tapping a minor child's conversations within the
family home."'69 Similarly, by exempting parents from Title III in
certain circumstances under the doctrine of vicarious consent, the
62. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991); Kempf v.
Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372,
373(4th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1976).
63. See Kempf, 868 F.2d at 973; Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540.
64. Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. On Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, 89th Cong., pt. 5 at 2261
(1965-66).
65. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2112, 2274.
66. See Jones, 542 F.2d at 668-69; Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 374; Heggy, 944 F.2d at
1541.
67. Hearings on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., pt. 2
at 413 (1967).
68. See Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 374 (Title III prohibits all wiretapping activities
unless specifically excepted"); Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 607 (6th 1998)
(refusing to apply the extension exemption to wiretapping in the home); Kempf v.
Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th 1989) (agreeing with Pritchard).
69. See Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Sixth Circuit in Pollock held that not all domestic wiretapping
should be prohibited.7 °
Vicarious consent was first introduced in Thompson v.
Dulaney.71 The District Court in Thompson held that a parent
could vicariously consent on behalf of a child if the parent has a
"good faith basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that it
is necessary.., and in the best interest of the child. '2 Subsequent
to the Thompson decision, both state and federal district courts
have adopted this line of reasoning. 7 At the circuit court level,
whether vicarious consent qualifies under the consent exemption to
absolve recording parents of criminal liability became a question of
first impression in Pollock.74
III. The Consent Exemption
It shall not be unlawful.., for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.75
While Congress does not specifically provide for vicarious
consent within this language,76 all but one court considering
parental wiretapping under the consent exemption have interpreted
Title III to include vicarious consent.77  The Michigan Court of
Appeals' first hearing of Williams v. Williams refused to follow this
interpretation.8  In that case, the custodial father recorded two
phone conversations between his five-year old son and the
noncustodial mother.79 The trial court adopted vicarious consent
70. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
71. 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah, 1993).
72. Id. at 1544.
73. See Silas v. Silas, 680 So.2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Pollock v. Pollock,
975 F. Supp. 974 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.2d 1186 (E.D. Ark.
1998); Williams v. Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Wagner v.
Wagner, 64 F. Supp.2d 895 (D. Minn. 1999).
74. See Pollock, 154 F.3d 606-07 (discussing that the courts to have ruled on
this issue were a few district courts).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)(1994).
76. See id.
77. See Silas, 680 So.2d 368; Pollock, 975 F. Supp. 974; Campbell, 2 F.Supp.2d
1186; Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114; Wagner, 64 F. Supp.2d 895.
7& See Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
79. See id. at 778.
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and granted the father summary judgment, finding no genuine issue
of material fact that he acted in the best interests of his son.80 On
appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
refused to create a judicial vicarious consent exemption, because
Title III does not specifically provide for one in its language.8' It
further concluded that Congress could have created this exemption
had it intended for parents to consent on behalf of their minor
children. 2 It reasoned that the legislature is in a better position to
determine if such an exemption should be added to Title III,
because they can weigh the policy and privacy issues regarding the
extent of privacy expected from family members in the home.83
The Michigan Supreme Court remanded Williams on appeal
for consideration in light of Pollock.' On remand, the Court of
Appeals was compelled by the Sixth Circuit's decision to adopt
vicarious consent but nevertheless clearly stated its opposing view
on the issue." Williams was brought under both the Federal
Wiretapping Act and the Michigan Eavesdropping statute86 which
contains a similar consent provision.87 While the court followed the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the Federal Act, it refused to find
such an exemption in the Michigan statute for lack of legislative
intent. The court's statement, "[w]e remain convinced that the
delicate question posed in this case and the effect that its resolution
may have both on how family law is practiced and the relationship
between the child and each of the parents, is more appropriately
commended to the legislative branch," implies that in the absence
80. See id.
81. See id. at 780.
82. See id.
83. See Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 781.
84. See Williams v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. 1991).
85. See Williams v. Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
86. See 24A MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.807(3) (West 1990). The Michigan
statute provides the following;
Any person who is present or who is not present during a private
conversation and who willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the
conversation without the consent of all parties thereto, or who knowingly
aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in violation of
this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in a state
prison for not more than 2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00,
or both.
Id.
87. See Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 778.
88. See Williams, 603 N.W.2d at 116.
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of Pollock it would have refused the adoption of vicarious consent
under the Federal Act as well. 89
The perspective that developed from Williams is quite narrow.
The consent exemption is meant to be interpreted broadly."
Congress found it unnecessary to specifically enumerate each way
consent may be given. The word "consent" is a general term that
can be given by actual or implied consent." When an individual
lacks the capacity to consent,92 their guardian is empowered to
consent on their behalf. Parents, as the natural guardians of their
children, hold the legal right to act on their behalf to make
decisions for their protection. 93 Parents must consent for their
minor children to marry, receive medical treatment, and sometimes
to practice contraception.94 There are certain situations where a
parent's authority is overridden, and minors do not need the
consent of their parents, such as the decision to obtain an
abortion.9  Wiretapping does not rise to the level of privacy
debated over abortion laws.96 However, it can be argued that the
conflict over the privacy issue of minors, most likely teenagers, can
create "profound effects on the family relationship and on parental
control."'  Nonetheless, taping a child's phone conversations is no
different than listening in on an extension phone.98 It is also no
greater of an intrusion than a parent snooping through a child's
bedroom or reading a diary - all common parental acts.99
Expanding a child's privacy rights beyond the fundamental rights of
abortion treads too far into parental autonomy.
89. Id.
90. See Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1091 (E.D. Ark. 1998);
Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Utah 1993).
91. See Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1543.
92. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
93. See Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544.
94. See id.
95. See David J. Anderman, Title III at a Crossroads: The Ordinary Course of
Business in the Home, the Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 2261, 2292 n.135 (June 1993).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Newcomb v. Ingle, 644
F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The fact that appellee here taped the
conversation which he permissibly overheard, we find.., to be a distinction
without a difference"); Silas v. Silas, 680 So.2d 368, 370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(". . the courts found that a parent's recording of a telephone conversation from
an extension telephone is a distinction without a difference from the parent's
listening to a telephone conversation on an extension telephone").
99. Thirty-three percent of surveyed teenagers were concerned that their
parents eavesdropped on their phone calls. See Anderman, supra note 95, at 2263.
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Qualifying vicarious consent under the consent exemption is
supported by other circuit court decisions.' The Second, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits did not expressly reject vicarious consent when
they exempted parents under the extension exemption." In light of
their holdings, the Second and Seventh Circuits found it
unnecessary to address vicarious consent.0 2  These circuits
acknowledged the applicability of vicarious consent, but found the
extension exemption more favorable in such situations."
A. Objectively Reasonable Parents and Best Interests
Vicarious consent is always necessary to protect children in
cases of verbal, emotional, or sexual abuse by a parent.'O In Silas v.
Silas, the Alabama court interpreted its state version of Title III to
conclude that vicarious consent qualifies for the consent exemption
under some circumstances other than abuse." While the Silas court
did not adopt the best interest language of Thompson, it set forth
that a parent must have a "good faith basis.., to believe that the
minor child is being abused, threatened, or intimidated by the other
parent."' 6 Nevertheless, the purpose of the Silas test is to protect
the child from harm. While it is agreeable that vicarious consent
should apply to situations of abuse as clearly being in the child's
best interests, what qualifies as an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that the child is being threatened, intimidated or
otherwise subjected to a future harm, is not always clear.
What the parent believes often conflicts with the testimony of
the child, and most commonly the other parent.'O' In Pollock,
Sandra believed that Courtney was subjected to psychological and
emotional pressure." However, Courtney and her father declared
that her mother recorded her phone calls because she became angry
100. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679-680; Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 155 n.6.
(7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1534.
101. See cases cited supra note 100.
102. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679-680; Scheib, 22 F.3d at 155 n.6.
103. See cases cited supra note 102.
104. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998).
105. 680 So.2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
106. See id. The child, on visitation with his father, would cry and become
extremely upset during phone conversations with his mother. See id.
Psychologists confirmed from the tapes that the mother was verbally abusing the
child. See id. at 371-72; see also Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678 (stating that the
mother used foul and abusive language with her children over the phone).
107. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 603-05; Scheib, 22 F.3d at 155 n.5.
108. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 604.
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when she learned that Courtney's father had hired an attorney."
In Scheib, the father believed that conversations between his son
and his son's mother caused his son to become extremely upset and
refuse to talk to anyone in the family."° Yet, his son stated that
while he was angry and upset after speaking to his mother, it was
not the phone conversations that upset him.' When determining if
a parent acted in the child's best interest, courts should look at the
situation as it appears to the parent, not the reality of the situation,
nor what is perceived by the child.112
However, can a parent who is in the middle of a custody
dispute be completely objective? Isn't it likely that parents will
claim that they acted in their child's best interest just to spy on their
ex-spouse? Parents often are motivated by other concerns, such as
revenge or control, and may not only record in their child's best
interests, but also may do so to obtain negative information about
their ex-spouse. It can be difficult to separate these other concerns
from a bests interests claim."3
Pollock implies that a direct correlation must exist between the
child's behavior and the recorded conversation." ' The court made a
factual distinction between Sandra's observations and Courtney's
behavior patterns in Pollock from the circumstances of Silas and
Scheib in support of its decision to deny summary judgment to
Sandra."5 In Silas, the father noticed that his seven-year old son
became extremely upset and began to cry during phone
conversations with his mother."6 Similarly, in Scheib, the father
noticed several times that his eleven-year old child became upset
immediately after speaking to his mother."7 Unlike the situation in
Silas and Scheib, Sandra noticed only a gradual change in
Courtney's behavior, which she thought included an excessive or
compulsive desire to be with her father."' From this distinction,
one can conclude that the observations upon which parents should
109. See id. at 605.
110. See Scheib, 22 F.3d at 155 n.5.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 155.
113. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 612. Although Sandra claimed that she acted in
Courtney's best interest, Courtney's father and stepmother claimed that Sandra
recorded Courtney's conversations out of anger towards Courtney. See id. at 605.
114. See Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 612.
115. See id.
116. See Silas v. Silas, 680 So.2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
117. See Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151; see also Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.2d 1186,
1187 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
118. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 612.
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base their best interest defense must occur during or shortly after
the phone conversations take place. This direct correlation would
deter parents from claiming any excuse as being in their child's best
interest.1 9  Without it, the consent exemption could have
"widespread implications and may encompass surreptitious actions
by parents with less than laudable motives. '"2 '
B. Consenting Children
The Pollock court refused to limit the application of vicarious
consent to children of certain ages because children develop both
emotionally and intellectually at different stages.12' The *word
''consent" means a "voluntary agreement by a person in the
possession and exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an
intelligent choice to do something proposed by another."1"2 At very
young ages, children do not have the ability to understand the
,,123nature of consent and to make "a truly voluntary decision ....
Children not only lack the legal capacity to consent, but also lack
the ability to give actual consent, either express or implied.12 ' The
Pollock court thought that it would be problematic for courts to
attempt to determine at what age a child would be able to consent
121on his own.
Pollock could be interpreted to support the contention that a
minor's age should be considered when determining the
applicability of the exemption. Although Pollock did not address
Courtney's ability to consent, the court's "obvious distinction"
between the children's ages in Thompson and Pollock implies that
Courtney, age 14, may have had the ability to understand the
nature of consent.1 26 Thompson also furthers the notion that age
may be considered as a factor in a best interest analysis.
Thompson, like Pollock, does not address whether the children
119. See id. at 610 ("We stress that.., this doctrine should not be interpreted as
permitting parents to tape any conversation involving their child simply by
invoking the magic words: 'I was doing it in his/her best interest.").
120. Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
121. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
122. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990).
123. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Utah 1993).
Thompson did not address whether the children could voluntarily consent because
they were only three and five years old and lacked the ability to understand the
nature of consent and could not "in any meaningful sense." Id.
124. See id.
125. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
126. See id. at 608.
127. See Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1543.
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could voluntarily consent because they were only three and five
years old,128 but does cite and agree with Luna v. State of
Oklahoma29 where the court found that a seventeen year old who
lacked the legal capacity to consent to wear a wiretap was able to
"freely and voluntarily" consent.1 30  Despite these implications,
Pollock makes clear that the focus of a vicarious analysis should be
on the recording parent's obligation to satisfy the best interest
standard."' This concentration will also avoid many quandaries in
allowing such a determination.
In an attempt to protect an older child, parents will risk
imprisonment up to five years and/or a fine 132 in hopes that a court
will agree with their determination of their own child's maturity.
Since it is nearly impossible to establish legal guidelines for this
type of evaluation, should parents be burdened with having their
child professionally evaluated to protect themselves and their own
judgment from prosecution? Other areas of the law do not allow a
case-by-case determination of a child's psychological ability to
consent, or more accurately their maturity level. The law sets age
limits for things such as driving, voting, serving in the military,
consuming alcohol, and especially the capacity to contract. When a
suit ensues based on a minors incapacity to contract, should courts
be allowed to consider the minor's ability to understand the nature
of contractual obligations? Undoubtedly so. This defense is deeply
rooted in our common law tradition, as is the right to raise one's
children as one sees best.
Another drawback to allowing an age consideration is that
cases will become complicated with expert testimony and character
evidence from both parties regarding the child's mental capacity.
Moreover, children involved in the situations that underlie parental
wiretapping cases are often caught in the middle of a bitter custody
dispute. They are vulnerable and heavily influenced by their
feuding parents. They have feelings of guilt, anger, depression, and
128. See id.
129. 815 P.2d 1197 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
130. See Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1543.
131. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610. The court stated that
We conclude that although the child in this case is older than the children
in the cases discussed above in which the doctrine of vicarious consent
has been adopted, we agree with the district court's adoption of the
doctrine, provided that a clear emphasis is put. on the need for the
'consenting' parent to demonstrate a good faith, objectively reasonable
basis for believing such consent was necessary for the welfare of the child.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1994).
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confusion, and are often torn when obligated to choose one parent
over the other. When you add the pressure from parents to this
mixed bag of emotions, children in such situations are not likely to
be able to think objectively for their own best interest.
The exemption debate should be abandoned and the vicarious
consent doctrine adopted for several reasons. First, the argument
that legislative intent is indicative of Congress's desire to include all
domestic wiretapping within the purviews of Title III is not well
supported. The very comments by Senator Long and Professor
Blakey relied on to reach this conclusion focused only on
wiretapping between spouses.133  The exclusion of parental
wiretapping from these comments indicate Congress's desire to
avoid deciding the amount of privacy between a parent and child.
Further, the purpose of the act is to prevent organized crime, not
family disputes." '
Second, parental wiretapping is qualitatively different from
interspousal wiretapping."' Unlike spouses who can sever their
relationship by a divorce, a parent-child relationship is permanent.
Finally, vicarious consent focuses the analysis on why the
wiretapping occurred under the best interest standard instead of
how. Based on the extension exemption's plain language, parents
should be exempt in every situation, because it looks to the way the
recording occurred - in the ordinary course of raising one's
children.'36 Vicarious consent on the other hand establishes a
narrower test that is less likely to be abused. Defendant parents are
placed with the burden of demonstrating that they acted in the
child's best interests in order to avoid liability.137 They may not




In the past, the United States Courts of Appeals have analyzed
a recording parent's actions under only the extension exemption.39
133. See Hearings (1965-66), supra note 64, at pt. 5, 2261 ("the three major
areas in which private electronic surveillance was widespread were (1) industrial,
(2) divorce cases, and (3) politics"); Hearings (1967), supra note 67, at pt. 2, 413
("private bugging in this country can be divided into two broad categories,
commercial espionage and marital litigation.").
134. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d 1977).
135. See Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1991).
136. See Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994).
137. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998).
138. Id.
139. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677; Newcomb, 944 F.2d 1534; Scheib, 22 F.3d
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As a matter of first impression, the Sixth Circuit in Pollock adopted
vicarious consent under the consent exemption to exempt recording
parents so long as it was done in the child's best interest." Since
Pollock, both state and federal courts have adopted its line of
reasoning.
Although a parent cannot. claim any excuse for the exemption
to apply,42 Pollock is clear in stating that the exemption should
always apply in cases of abuse.143 While the basis for the parent's
objective is not always clear, courts should focus on the parent's
perception of the situation."'
Pollock refused to establish an age limit when a child has the
capacity to consent on their own,145 but implied that the age of the
minor may be a factor in its decision." 6 Regardless of the child's
age, the emphasis of any vicarious consent analysis should be the
best interest standard.4 7
A few questions remain to be explored. Can individuals who
are not a child's legal guardian record the minor's phone calls while
the child is visiting their home if they believe a parent is abusing the
child?"4 The courts imply that a parent must vicariously consent,4 9
but a case has not been brought involving a non-parent, such as a
grandparent. Second, could fear that a child is using drugs, or is
about to commit a crime, be considered "best interest"? In State of
North Carolina v. Shaw, a mother who recorded a phone
conversation of her son, who was planning on "getting together
about 'shrooms' " with the other party to the conversation, was not
149.
140. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
141. See Wagner v. Wagner, 64 F. Supp.2d 895 (D. Minn. 1999); Williams v.
Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. App. Ct. 1999).
142. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
143. See id.; see also Silas v. Silas, 680 S.2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(holding that vicarious consent is necessary when a parent makes "abusive or
obscene phone calls threatening or intimidating minor children").
144. See Scheib, 22 F.3d at 155.
145. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
146. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
147. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
148. See Richard I. Zuber, Domestic Eavesdropping and Wiretapping:
Admissibility of Intercepted Communications, 21 COLO. LAWYER 455, 456 (March
1992).
149. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610. The court's language says that "the
'consenting' parent" must demonstrate the good faith basis. Id. (emphasis added).
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exempt under the extension exemption." The mother may have
been exempt had the court applied a best interest analysis.'
51
Until Congress clarifies its intent or the Supreme Court rules
on the applicability of Title III to domestic wiretapping, the consent
exemption is favorable to the extension exemption in parental
wiretapping cases. The legislative intent does not support the
inclusion of parents in Title III's prohibition, parental wiretapping
is qualitatively different from interspousal wiretapping, and the
vicarious consent doctrine creates a narrow test which focuses the
analysis on why a parent felt compelled to record the child's
152conversations. A parent must "demonstrate a good faith,
objectively reasonable basis for believing that it is necessary and in
the best interest of the child to consent on behalf of his or her
minor child .... .153
Laura S. Killian*
150. 404 S.E.2d 887, 887-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). After listening to her son's
call, the mother informed the police and played the recorded conversation, which
ultimately resulted in the arrest of the other individual. See id. at 269.
151. In this particular jurisdiction the mother probably would not have been
exempt under a vicarious consent analysis because North Carolina sits in the
Fourth Circuit which prohibits "all wiretapping activities unless specifically
excepted." Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984). Courts that
have accepted vicarious consent may find that this mother acted in her son's best
interest.
152. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
153. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
* This piece is dedicated to my mother for her tremendous faith in God,
strength, and courage.
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